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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this appeal from a final judgment 
of the Second Judicial District Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The 
Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
IL ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review in this case is whether the district court erred in 
denying appellant American Interstate Mortgage Corporation, Inc. (MAIM") attorneys' 
fees for the period of July 1999 to June 2000 on the basis that AIM did not supplement 
its previous discovery response prior to trial by delivering to opposing counsel copies of 
its billing statements from the Durbano Law Firm for that time period. (See R. at 700, at 
pp. 69-70, 124-26; R. at 524-58.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Whether Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 
34 require a party to produce copies of documents and supplement its discovery 
responses absent a court order is governed by a correction of error standard. See 
Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. 1999 UT App. 80, 977 P.2d 508 ("With respect to the 
trial court's selection, interpretation, and application of a particular rule of evidence or 
procedure, we apply a correction of error standard."); see also Utah Dep't of Transp. v. 
6200 S. Assocs.. 872 P.2d 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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III. RELEVANT RULES OF PROCEDURE 
The following Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are relevant to the issues before this 
Court. 
A. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(eV 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request 
for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to 
supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except as 
follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response 
with respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the 
identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, 
the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, an d the substances of 
his testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if 
he obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the 
response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such 
that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
1
 On November 1, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court entered an order approving 
amendments to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and directed that those amendments 
apply only to cases filed on or after November 1, 1999. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26, 
Advisory Committee Notes. Because the litigation out of which this appeal arose was 
filed before November 1, 1999, AIM cites and relies herein on the pre-amendment 
version of Rule 26. (See R. at 1-26.) 
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B. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 342 
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request 
(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone 
acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents 
(including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, 
and other data compilations from which information can be obtained, 
translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into 
reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any 
tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 
26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon 
whom the request is served; or 
(2) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the 
possession or control of the party upon whom the request is served for the 
purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or 
sampling the property or any designated object or operation thereon, within 
the scope of Rule 26(b). 
(b) Procedure. The request may, without leave of court, be served upon 
the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or 
after service of the summons and complaint upon that party. The request shall set 
forth the items to be inspected either by individual item or by category, and 
describe each item and category with responsible particularity. The request shall 
specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the inspection and 
performing the related acts. 
The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written response 
within 30 days after the service of the request, except that a defendant may serve a 
response within 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon that 
defendant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The response shall 
state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related activities 
will be permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to, in which event the 
reasons for objection shall be stated. If objection is made to part of an item or 
2
 Although it could cite the current version of Rule 34, AIM has cited herein the 
version of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 34 that was applicable at the time AIM 
responded to Edwards' discovery. Rule 34 was amended in 1999, but the portions of 
Rule 34 relevant to AIM's appeal have not been substantively modified. 
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category, the part shall be specified. The party submitting the request may move 
for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to 
respond to the request or any part thereof, or any failure to permit inspection as 
requested. 
(c) Persons not parties. This rule does not preclude an independent action 
against a person not a party for production of documents and things and 
permission to enter upon land. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case originated out of AIM's efforts to foreclose certain real property located 
in Weber County, Utah to satisfy a debt secured by a Trust Deed and Promissory Note. 
(R. at 1-26.) After the borrower, defendant Michael E. Flynn, repeatedly failed to make 
timely payments on the Note, AIM filed its complaint declaring the Note in default. (Id.) 
AIM's efforts to foreclose on the property were met with resistance by one 
defendant - Mr. James Edwards ("Edwards") - who had purchased an interest in the 
property through a Sheriffs sale, subject to the Note and Deed of Trust. (R. at 52-53, 
653.) For nearly two years, AIM and Edwards exchanged discovery, filed numerous 
motions, and eventually participated in a two-day bench trial before the Honorable W. 
Brent West. (R. at 516-17.) During the first day of that trial, AIM attempted to 
introduce its billing records to evidence the fees it had incurred in protecting its rights 
under the Note and Deed of Trust. (R. at 700, at pp. 69-70.) Included in that production 
were bills for fees totaling $11,456.95 for work performed by the Durbano Law Firm 
from July 1999 through June 2000. (Id.) The district court, however, refused to allow 
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the introduction of those billing records into evidence. (R. at 700, at pp. 124-26.) The 
court held that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26 imposed a duty on AIM to supplement 
its earlier discovery responses relating to those records, and that AIM had failed to 
satisfy that obligation. (Id.) Although the court granted AIM the fees it reasonably 
incurred outside of that time period, the court denied AIM the entire amount of fees it 
incurred from July 1999 through June 2000. (R. at 654-58.) AIM appeals from that 
judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Disposition Below 
On October 28, 1998, AIM commenced this foreclosure action in the Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of Utah. (R. at 1-26.) On July 18 and 20, 
2000, a bench trial was held before the Honorable W. Brent West. (R. at 515-17.) 
During the course of the bench trial, Judge West entered an order from the bench 
granting AIM's foreclosure and awarding certain attorneys' fees and costs. The Court, 
however, denied AIM's request for attorneys' fees relating to work performed during the 
July 1999 through June 2000 time period. (R. at 700, at pp. 124-26.) 
On July 21, 2000, AIM filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or for New 
Trial pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59. (R. at 524-58.) By its 
motion, AIM sought to amend certain portions of the court's order, including its decision 
to deny certain attorneys' fees incurred during the time period of July 1999 through June 
2000 pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id) 
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On September 29, 2000, the district court entered an amended Findings of Fact, 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. (R. at 652-59.) By entering the amended Findings 
of Fact, Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, the district court effectively granted, in 
part, AIM's motion to alter or amend the judgment, but denied AIM's motion as it 
related to the July 1999 - June 2000 attorneys' fees. (See id) 
AIM timely filed its Notice of Appeal on October 19, 2000. (R. at 677-80.)3 
V. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. The Parties 
1. On or about August 28, 1981, James M. Rothey and Beverley Rothey, as 
trustor, and Mountain West Savings & Loan, as beneficiary, executed a Deed of Trust 
(the "Deed of Trust") and Promissory Note (the "Note") relating to certain real property 
located in Weber County, Utah. (R. at 653.) 
2. The rights and obligations under the Deed of Trust and Note were 
subsequently assumed from the Rotheys by Michael E. Flynn, while Mountain West 
Savings & Loan assigned its rights to AIM. (Id.) 
3. James and Helen Edwards purchased an interest in the real property 
through a sheriffs sale, subject to the Note and Deed of Trust. (Id.) 
3
 The procedural history of this matter is more detailed than that set forth herein. 
Most of that history, however, is irrelevant to the issues presented to this Court by AIM's 
appeal. Therefore, AIM has described only those portions of the procedural history that 
are relevant to the issues now before the Court. 
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4. Neither James nor Helen Edwards, nor their son Bruce Edwards, ever 
assumed, or attempted to assume, the Note and Deed of Trust and therefore are not 
entitled to the rights of the borrower thereunder.4 (Id.) 
5. All of the defendants originally named in the complaint, aside from James 
Edwards, disclaimed their interest, had default entered, or were dismissed by the district 
court. (R. at700, atp.3.) 
B. The Default 
6. No payments have been made under the Note since January 1998. (R. at 
653.) 
7. The Deed of Trust allows AIM, as lender, to disburse sums and to take 
such action as is necessary to protect its interests. (R. at 654.) The Deed of Trust allows 
AIM to include any amounts disbursed (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees) as 
additional indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust. (Id.) 
C. The Foreclosure Action 
8. On October 28, 1998, AIM filed suit to foreclose on the Deed of Trust. (R. 
at 1-26.) 
9. During the course of the proceedings, as well as a related action initiated by 
Edwards, AIM incurred significant legal fees to protect its interests. (R. at 654-55.) 
4
 James Edwards passed away in the Winter of 2000. In 2001, his son, Bruce C. 
Edwards was appointed as the personal representative of James Edwards' estate. 
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AIM was represented throughout most of these proceedings by the Durbano Law Firm. 
(R. at 654-56.) 
10. The district court recognized that a significant majority of the fees incurred 
by AIM were reasonably and necessarily incurred to protect its interests. For example, 
the district court determined that fees in the amount of $17,346.25 were reasonably 
incurred and necessary to protect AIM's interest during the course of a lawsuit brought 
by Edwards against AIM. (R. at 654-55.) The court therefore added these fees to the 
principal balance under the Note and Deed of Trust as of January 28, 1998, and ordered 
that interest be charged at the rate of 7.75% from that date until trial for a total of 
$21,072.25. (R. at 655.) 
11. The district court also found that AIM reasonably and necessarily incurred 
an additional $9,788.41 in costs and fees in bringing this foreclosure action. (R. at 656.) 
12. However, the district court refused to allow an additional $11,456.95 in 
fees, incurred during July 1999 through June 2000, to be charged under the Note and 
Deed of Trust. (Id.) The district court disallowed these fees based on its finding that 
AIM did not supplement its discovery responses prior to trial to include billing 
statements from the Durbano Law Firm for July 1999 through June 2000. (Id.) 
13. The Court also disallowed $1,000 in attorneys' fees incurred by AIM in 
bringing its motion to reconsider. (Id.) 
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D. AIM's Discovery Responses 
14. In July 1999, Edwards served Interrogatories and Requests for the 
Production of Documents on AIM's counsel. (R. at 277-80.) Document Request No. 7 
requested all "time slips, billings, and payment records . . . relating to the . . . prosecution 
of the present legal action," and Document Request No. 8 sought the production of "[a]ll 
documents that [AIM] and his [sic] counsel intend to introduce into evidence at the trial 
of the matter, not previously furnished to [Edwards] as part of the court's order 
compelling discovery." (R. at 278.) 
15. On August 12,1999, AIM responded to both Document Requests as 
follows: 
All documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and 
place. 
(R. at 271, 276.) 
16. As a courtesy to counsel, AIM included with its written answers copies of 
the billing records that had been created to date by the Durbano Law Firm relating to this 
matter. (R. at 700, at pp. 124-125.) At no time after that production did Edwards or his 
counsel accept AIM's invitation made pursuant to Rule 34 to inspect or copy any 
additional documents. (R. at 700, at p. 125.) 
17. During the two-day trial of this matter, AIM's counsel attempted to 
introduce billing records evidencing the attorneys' fees incurred during the July 1999 -
June 2000 time period. (R. at 700, at pp. 69-70.) In reliance on Rule 26, the Court 
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refused to accept such evidence on the basis that the information had not been provided 
as supplementation to AIM's answer to Edwards' previous discovery request. (R. at 
700, at pp. 124-26.) 
18. At the time of the trial in this matter, there was no court order in place 
requiring the parties' to supplement their discovery responses. (R. at 702, at pp. 22-25.) 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in refusing to allow AIM to introduce evidence of the fees 
it reasonably incurred in seeking to foreclose on Note and Deed of Trust during the July 
1999 through June 2000 time period. By making the billing records available to 
Edwards for inspection, AIM complied with the requirements of Rules 26 and 34 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. AIM was required to do nothing more. AIM had no 
obligation to produce copies of the records to Edwards, and it had no duty to supplement 
its original production. Therefore, the district court erred in refusing to allow AIM to 
introduce evidence of the fees it reasonably incurred. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
The district court concluded that nearly all of the fees AIM incurred to protect its 
interests under the Note and Deed of Trust were reasonably and necessarily incurred. 
The only significant fees denied by the district court were those fees billed between July 
1999 and June 2000. In denying those fees, the district court relied on Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 26 and 34, finding that AIM had a duty to produce copies of its billing 
records to Edwards and to subsequently supplement that production. The district court's 
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decision should be reversed. Rule 34 imposes no obligation on AIM to produce copies 
of its billing records; rather, the Rule requires only that a party make the documents 
available for inspection. AIM satisfied this obligation. Moreover, the 1998 version of 
Rule 26, applicable in this case, imposed no obligation on AIM to supplement its 
responses. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's decision denying 
these fees of $11,456.95 and enter an order allowing these fees to be charged under the 
Note and Deed of Trust. 
A. AIM Complied with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 34 by Making its 
Billing Records Available to Edwards for Inspection. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2) requires that a party responding to a 
request for the production of documents serve a written response to the request stating 
"that inspection or related activities will be permitted as requested." Utah R. Civ. P. 
34(b)(2). There can be no dispute that AIM satisfied the requirements of Rule 34. In 
response to Edwards' request that AIM produce all billing records and other documents 
that AIM intended to introduce into evidence at trial, AIM responded as follows: 
All documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and 
place. 
(R. at 271.) This was all that AIM was required to do. At no time did Edwards or his 
counsel accept AIM's invitation and request to inspect or copy any additional 
documents. AIM cannot be penalized for Edwards' failure to request review of these 
documents. Given that AIM complied with its obligations under Rule 34, the district 
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court erred in refusing to allow AIM to present evidence which had been made available 
to Edwards. 
B. Pursuant to the 1998 Version of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 
Applicable to this Case, AIM Had No Duty to Supplement its 
Discovery Responses. 
During the trial of this matter, the district court rejected AIM's argument that it 
had complied with the relevant discovery rules by making the Durbano Law Firm's 
billing records available for inspection pursuant to Rule 34. The district court stated that 
ff[t]he rules say that there is an ongoing burden of discovery upon the party to disclose 
the discovery." (R. at 700, at p. 125.) The court continued: "Bottom line is if you're the 
plaintiff in the case, and you want to present evidence, you have an ongoing duty to 
disclose that evidence as it becomes due or as it becomes known to you." (Id.) In fact, 
the court reasoned that "the plaintiff has an ongoing duty to disclose any evidence that 
[it] intend[s] to rely on. It's solely within your realm." (R. at 700, at pp. 125-26.) The 
court's reasoning was in error. Given that AIM had properly responded to Edwards' 
discovery request by making its documents available for inspection, there was no 
ongoing duty to supplement. 
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.5 The version of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) applicable to this case provides: 
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response 
that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to 
include information thereafter acquired except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response 
with respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the 
identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial.. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if 
he obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the 
response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such 
that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(e) (emphasis added). Because AIM's responses to Edwards' 
document requests were complete at the time they were made, AIM was under no 
subsequent duty to supplement its response. Moreover, none of the exceptions to Rule 
26(e) are applicable to the information sought by Edwards. 
First, the billing records clearly do not fall within exception (1) which requires the 
supplemental production of the names of persons with relevant knowledge and the 
identification of expert witness. 
5
 Rule 26 was amended in November 1, 1999. The Utah Supreme Court has 
made clear that the amendments to Rule 26 to not apply to cases filed before that date. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes. 
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Second, the billing records do not fall within exception (2) which requires the 
supplementation of responses which were incorrect when made, or which are no longer 
true, and where failure to amend the response "is in substance a knowing concealment." 
Id. AIM's agreement to make records available was more than adequate. Certainly, 
AIM cannot be penalized for not subsequently producing copies of records which it was 
not required to produce at the time of its original response. Moreover, the fact that AIM, 
as a courtesy to counsel, produced some billing records at the time it made its original 
response does not change its obligations. AIM continued to make further billing records 
available (in full compliance with Rule 34), and the fact that it did not produce copies of 
subsequent records did not make its original response untrue, and it certainly cannot be 
said to constitute a "knowing concealment." Due to the nature of the billing records, 
Edwards was well aware that additional billing records would be generated subsequent to 
AIM's original response. AIM was not hiding any information and it would have 
allowed inspection of those documents pursuant to Rule 34 upon request. 
Finally, the billing records to not fall within exception (3) which requires 
supplementation when ordered by the court, when the parties agree to supplement, or 
where requests for supplementation are specifically made. There is no dispute that there 
was no order requiring supplementation. Id. The district court clearly based its decision 
on Rule 26. (R. at 700, at pp. 124-26; R. at 702, at pp. 22-25.) Moreover, there was no 
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agreement reached between the parties requiring supplementation and there was no 
request made by Edwards. (R. at 700, at p. 125.) 
Because Rule 26 specifically states that the parties are not under a duty to 
supplement their discovery responses, and because AIM's response to Edwards' request 
for billing records does not fall within one of the three exceptions provided in Rule 26, 
the district court's refusal to allow the introduction of evidence of the attorneys' fees 
AIM incurred during the July 1999 through June 2000 time period should be reversed. 
C. It Was Error to Sanction AIM By Excluding Its Evidence of 
Attorneys' Fees at Trial Where No Judicial Deadline Had Been 
Created. 
The district court erred by refusing to allow AIM to introduce evidence of the 
more than $11,000 of fees it incurred over a one-year period given that (1) AIM 
complied with Rule 34 and (2) the 1998 version of Rule 26 imposed no obligation on 
AIM to supplement its responses. In addition to that, Utah courts have recognized that 
sanctioning a party for failure to supplement its responses by excluding its evidence is 
inappropriate absent a judicially-imposed deadline. In Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Co. Inc.. for example, the Utah Court of Appeals expressly held that it 
was improper for the district court to sanction a party by excluding oral testimony 
"[a]bsent an order creating a judicially imposed deadline." 830 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). The Berrett court recognized that a trial court's "power to sanction a party 
for failure to cooperate in discovery comes from Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
SaltLake-144988.1 0040913-00001 15 
Procedure," and that 'the necessary prerequisite to the imposition of a sanction is an 
order that 'brings the offender squarely within possible contempt of court." Id. at 294. 
Although the Berrett court was considering the exclusion of witness testimony, rather 
than documentary evidence, its reasoning is equally applicable here. Neither the parties 
nor the court entered into a scheduling order or stipulation creating supplementation 
obligations or deadlines for the exchange of witness lists or exhibits. Absent such an 
order, AIM did not violate any deadline which warranted the sanction of disallowing the 
presentation of relevant evidence of more than $11,000 in attorneys' fees reasonably 
incurred by AIM. Thus, the decision of the district court to preclude this evidence 
should be reversed.6 
D. James Edwards' Estate Had No Standing to Oppose the Foreclosure 
and Similarly Has No Standing to Oppose this Appeal. 
AIM anticipates that Edwards will file a brief in opposition to AIM's request of 
this Court to reverse the trial court's decision regarding its attorneys' fees. Edwards, 
however, does not have standing to challenge AIM's position. The district court held 
that because Edwards did not assume the Note or Deed of Trust, he has no rights under 
those documents. Rather, those rights belong exclusively to the borrower, Michael 
6
 In addition to the foregoing, the district court erred in denying AIM the $1,000 
in fees it incurred to bring its Motion to Reconsider. (R. at 656.) Because the Court 
denied AIM's Motion, it denied its fees. AIM respectfully requests that the Court allow 
the $1,000 in additional fees to be charged under the Note and Deed of Trust for the 
work done in preparation of its Motion to Reconsider. 
SaltLake-144988.1 0040913-00001 16 
Flynn. Because of that lack of privity with AIM, Edwards will have no obligation to pay 
the additional fees AIM seeks and therefore he has no standing to assert a defense to 
those claims. Rather, AIM seeks to have these fees charged under the Note and Deed of 
Trust as costs reasonably incurred in protecting its rights thereunder. Edwards does not 
have the right to challenge AIM.7 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, AIM specifically requests that this Court correct the 
reversible error of the trial court, by allowing AIM to submit evidence that an additional 
and reasonable amount of $11,456.95 of attorneys' fees and costs were incurred between 
July 1999 and June 2000. AIM further requests that this Court enter an order allowing 
the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs arising from this appeal to be charged under the 
Note and Deed of Trust. These fees have been necessarily incurred by AIM to protect its 
interests. See also Valarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (quoting Utah 
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) stating that 
"when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, 'the party is also 
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal'"). 
7
 AIM recognizes that the Estate of James Wesley Edwards has filed a cross-
appeal and that Edwards has taken the position that it enjoys privity with AIM and 
therefore has standing to challenge AIM's pursuit of its costs and attorneys' fees. AIM 
maintains, however, as it did below, that Edwards (and now his estate) has no interest in 
the real property and no privity of contract with AIM. Thus, Edwards' estate lacks 
standing to oppose this appeal. 
SaltLake-144988 1 0040913-00001 17 
DATED this H~ day of May, 2001. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
GK|xh*tfY^^ 
David J. Jordan 
Jill M. Pohlman 
Karen P. Whitt 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IX. ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (dated September 29, 
2000) (R. at 652-72) 
Excerpts from Transcript of Bench Trial Held July 18 and July 20, 2000 
Before The Honorable W. Brent West (R. at 700, pp. 69-70, 124-126) 
Excerpts from Transcript of Hearing Held September 20, 2000 Before The 
Honorable W. Brent West (R. 702, pp. 22-25) 
Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant Edwards' Request for Production of 
Documents and Interrogatories (dated August 12, 1999) (R. at 269-276) 
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Tab A 
Douglas M. Durbano (#4209) 
George W. Burbidge II (#6503) 
DURBANO LAW FIRM 
Attorneys for Plaintiff c ?- 4 
476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., #200 ^-? ^ ^ 2 5 ?\\ '03 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 776-4111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN INTERSTATE MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, a non resident corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL E. FLYNN; INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, an agency of the United States 
America; BOLT AND NUT SUPPLY; 
SWANSON BUILDING MATERIALS; 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION; OHIO 
CASUALTY INSURANCE; BRUCE C. 
EDWARDS; JAMES EDWARDS; HELEN 
EDWARDS; AND JOHN DOES I THRU X, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE 
SEP 2 9 2000 
Civil No. 980907330 
Judge W. Brent West 
This matter having come before this Court for trial on July 18 and 20,2000. Plaintiffs vice 
president, Rick Hayden was present, along with George W. Burbidge II, attorney for Plaintiff. 
Defendant James Edwards was present with his attorney David J. Knowlton. Defendant Ohio 
Casualty Insurance did not appear, its answer was stricken and a default judgment was entered 
against it. Upon reviewing the file, the Court finds that all other Defendants have disclaimed their 
interest, had their default entered, or have been dismissed by this Court. The Court having reviewed 
the pleadings and the evidence introduced at trial, and being otherwise fully advised enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Deed of Trust dated August 28,1981, by and between James M. Rothey and 
Beverly Rothey as Trustor (which has been assumed by Defendant Michael E. Flynn) and Mountain 
West Savings & Loan, Beneficiary (which has been assigned to Plaintiff, American Interstate 
Mortgage Corporation) constitutes a good and sufficient mortgage lien upon the herein below 
described real property (the "Property") in favor of the Plaintiff which is prior and superior to the 
liens of all Defendants and each of them. The Property is situated in Weber County, State of Utah 
and is more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 2, Crowther Subdivision, in South Ogden City, Weber County, Utah, 
according to the official plat thereof. 
Address: 4695 Burch Creek Drive, South Ogden, Utah 84403 
2. Defendants James and Helen Edwards purchased an interest in the property at issue 
through a Sheriffs sale, subject to the Note and Deed of Trust which is the subject of this foreclosure 
action. 
3. Neither James, Helen or Bruce Edwards (the "Edwards") ever assumed the Note and 
Deed of Trust, or attempted to assume the Note and Deed of Trust. Since they did not assume the 
Note and Deed of Trust, the Edwards did not become the "Borrower" under the Note and Deed of 
Trust, and are unable to claim or enforce the rights which the Note and Deed of Trust grant 
exclusively to the Borrower, including the right to notice beyond what is required by law. 
4. No payments have been made under the Note since January, 1998. 
5. The Note is in default, and American Interstate Mortgage is entitled to an Order of 
Foreclosure. 
6. Defendants James and Helen Edwards were served with a summons and complaint 
in this action, which was the notice they were entitled to receive under law. 
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7. The Deed of Trust allows Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage, as Lender, to 
disburse sums and take such action as is necessary to protect the Lender's interests, including but 
not limited to attorney's fees, and to include any amounts disbursed, with interest thereon, as 
additional indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust. 
8. According to §1 of the Revision and Assumption Agreement, which is part of the 
Note, interest to be charged on the principal balance shall not be less than 7.75%. 
9. In 1994, Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage reasonably incurred legal fees of 
$898.74 for research to determine if a foreclosure action could be commenced, and in corresponding 
with the occupant of the property regarding overdue payments. This amount was reasonably incurred 
in protecting Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgages' interest as Lender under the Note and Deed 
of Trust and is properly included as additional indebtedness on the Note and Deed of Trust, together 
with compounding interest at 7.75% from January 28,1998 to July, 20,2000, the date of trial. This 
amount with interest comes to a total of $1,090.89 (see attached Exhibit "A"). 
10. In 1994, Defendant Bruce C. Edwards brought a lawsuit against Plaintiff American 
Interstate Mortgage based upon the Note and Deed of Trust, case number 940900438. 
a. It was reasonable for American Interstate Mortgage to retain the Durbano Law 
Firm and incur legal fees to defend this action and to pursue foreclosure through a counterclaim. 
b. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by American Interstate Mortgage 
in that case was reasonable, even though it was denied. Factual disputes existed upon which 
American Interstate Mortgage eventually prevailed at trial. 
c. The finance charges billed by the Durbano Law Firm are not chargeable under 
the Note and Deed of Trust. 
3 
d. In this action, the Durbano Law Firm withdrew as counsel. The fees incurred 
between the time that the Durbano Law Firm entered its withdrawal until it entered its reappearance 
are not chargeable to the Note and Deed of Trust. The Court finds these fees to be 4 hours billed at 
$150 per hour for a total of $600.00. 
e. The remaining bills charged by the Durbano Law Firm, of $ 17,346.25 were 
reasonably incurred and necessary to protect Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage's interests as 
lender under the Note and Deed of Trust. These fees are properly added to the principal balance 
under the Note and Deed of Trust as of January 28,1998, and interest is to be charged at the rate of 
7.75% as of that date "until the date of trial for a total amount of $21,072.25 (see attached Exhibit 
"B"). 
11. Following a trial in the case of Bruce C. Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage, 
Judge Heffernan issued a Decision, dated January 28, 1998. In that Decision, the Court found that 
the principal balance owing at that time was $60,538.88. This Court will not disturb that ruling, and 
finds that amount to be the correct balance as of that date. According to the terms of the Note and 
Deed of Trust, compound interest has accrued on the unpaid amount at the rate of 7.75% which this 
Court finds should run from the date of the previous Decision, January 28, 1998, to July 20, 2000, 
the date of trial, for a total amount of $73,536.77 (see attached exhibit "C"). 
12. In 1998 and 1999, property taxes came due on the Property. There were no funds in 
any trust account to pay these taxes. Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage paid these property 
taxes and under the terms of the Deed of Trust is entitled to add them to the principal balance and 
charge interest at 7.75% according to the date which they were paid. Penalties for late payment are 
also properly included as charges under the Deed of Trust. Property taxes for 1998 of $1,404.46 
were paid on July 14,2000; property taxes for 1999 of $1,271.08 were paid on November 4,1999, 
4 
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together with interest at a rate of 7.75% up to July 20,2000 for a total of $2,764.19 chargeable under 
the Deed of Trust (see attached exhibit "D"). 
13. Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage incurred attorneys fees from the Durbano Law 
Firm in brining this foreclosure action. 
a. The interest charged by the Durbano Law Firm for late payments is not 
appropriately included as a charge under the Note and Deed of Trust. 
b. The fees incurred in bringing a Motion to Reconsider, which 8 hours were 
billed at a rate of $125.00 per hour for a total amount of $1,000 were not reasonably incurred and 
are not chargeable against the Note and Deed of Trust. 
c. Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage did not supplement its discovery 
responses prior to trial to include billing statements from the Durbano Law Firm for July, 1999 
through June, 2000. Because of this, the attorneys fees and costs incurred during these months 
which total $11,456.95 will not be allowed to be charged under the Note and Deed of Trust. 
d. Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage reasonably and necessarily incurred 
$9,788.41 in costs and attorneys fees in bringing this action which costs and fees are to be charged 
under the Note and Deed of Trust. 
e. Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage reasonably and necessarily incurred 
costs and attorneys fees in July 2000, in the amount of $ 2^Cx> j _ preparing for and participating 
in the trial of this matter, which fees are to be charged under the Note and Deed of Trust. 
f. Plaintiff is entitled to supplement the Judgment in this action by affidavit for 




14. The Note allows for a late fee of 4% of the principal and interest payment amount if 
payment is not made by the 15th day of the month it is due. The principal and interest amount is 
$595.00, which results in a late fee of $23.80. Thirty payments have been late for a total late fee 
amount of $714.00. 
15. On April 28, 1999, Defendant Bruce C. Edwards was awarded $375.00 against 
Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage as sanctions. On July 2,1999 Defendant Bruce C. Edwards 
was awarded $500.00 against American Interstate Mortgage as sanctions. On September 20,1999, 
Plaintiff American Interstate Mortgage was awarded $570.00 against Defendant Bruce C. Edwards 
as sanctions. At trial the parties agreed that these amounts could be included in this order as set off, 
resolution and satisfaction of any and all sanctions in this matter. Accordingly, $305.00 is to be 
deducted from the amount due under the Note and Trust Deed. 
16. The total amount due and owning under the Note and Trust Deed, as of July 20,2000 
is $108,661.51, plus costs and attorneys fees for July 2000, plus ongoing costs and attorneys fees to 
enforce this Judgment and for costs of sale. 
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises aforesaid, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Plaintiff is owed the following sums: 
A. $ 1,090.89 Fees of $898.00 incurred (other than from the 
Durbano Law Firm) protecting lender's interests 
under Deed of Trust, with interest from January 28, 
1998 to July 20, 2000. 
B. $21,072.25 Fees and costs of $17,346.25 incurred (from the 
Durbano Law Firm) protecting the lender's interest 
under the Deed of Trust, with interest from January 
28,1998 to July 20, 2000. 
C. $73,536.77 Principal balance of $60,538.88 together with interest 
from January 28, 1998 to July 20, 2000. 
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D. $ 2,764.19 Property taxes of $1,271.08 and $1,414.46 for 1998 
and 1999, plus interest from time paid to July 20, 
2000. 
E. $9,788.41 Costs and attorney's fees in this action incurred up to 
and including June 30,2000. 
F. $ 714.00 Late fees of $23.80 for 30 months. 
G. -$305.00 Sanctions resolution as described in f 15. 
$108,661.51 \ Subtotal Judgment. 
V7<P.*0 Costs and attorneys fees for July 2000. 
^_J) I 3(pU_G Total - plus after accruing amounts as detailed below. 
Plus interest on the total Judgment at the rate of 7.75% per annum from July 20, 2000 and 
thereafter until the total Judgment is paid along with costs and attorneys fees for July 2000, in the 
amount of $ 2 t HQ6 plus continuing costs and attorneys fees, all after accruing property 
taxes, costs of collection and sale, attorneys fees, trustees fees and other advances to protect and 
preserve the property until such amounts have been paid in full or otherwise satisfied. 
2. That the Deed of Trust dated August 28,1981, by and between James M. Rothey and 
Beverly Rothey as Trustor (which has been assumed by Michael E. Flynn) and Mountain West 
Savings & Loan, Beneficiary (which has been assigned to Plaintiff, American Interstate Mortgage 
Corporation) constitutes a good and sufficient mortgage lien upon the herein below described real 
property (the "Property") in favor of the Plaintiff which is prior and superior to the liens of all 
Defendants and each of them. The Property is situated in Weber County, State of Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 2, Crowther Subdivision, in South Ogden City, Weber County, Utah, 
according to the official plat thereof. 
Address: 4695 Burch Creek Drive, South Ogden, Utah 84403 
7 
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3. That the Property be sold by the Sheriff of Weber County in accordance with Utah 
law and the practice of this Court. 
4. That all right, title and interest of all Defendants and each of them in the Property, 
save the statutory right of redemption be forever barred and foreclosed. 
5. That the proceeds of said sale be applied first to the sums advanced or expended in 
preserving the Property and/or its value during the pendency of this action, satisfaction of accrued 
and accruing costs of this action, reasonable attorney's fees, interest and principal in that order. 
6. That the surplus of said sale, if any, be accounted for and paid by the Sheriff to the 
Clerk of this Court subject to the Court's further order; provided, however, that in the event the 
return of the Sheriff discloses a deficiency, that the Plaintiff have no money judgment against 
Trustor. 
7. That the Sheriff issue his Certificate of Sale to the purchaser at the sale. 
8. That the holder of the Certificate of Sale be let into possession of the property and 
receive the rents and income from the premises during the period of redemption. 
9. That the Sheriff issue his Sheriffs Deed to the holder thereof upon expiration of the 
statutory redemption period and let the grantee thereof into possession of the property and have all 
proper process of this Court in that behalf. 
DATED this J 2 ? ! r day of SSPfi/tyvftl 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
W. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David Knowlton, Attorney for 
James and Helen Edwards 
m 
8 £C;Q 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings 
of Fact, Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure postage prepaid, to the following, on this day 
of August, 2000: 
David J. Knowlton 
Attorney for Bruce C. Edwards 
James Edwards and Helen Edwards 
427 27th Street 
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costs, and interest. 
i 
those the total of costs and fees that were 
by the Durbano Law Firm in the case of Bruce C 
v. American Interstate Mortgage? 
A 
Q 







is it your testimony that those were reasonable 
-
KNOWLTON: I object as leading. I mean, 





COURT: It's been asked and answered. 
BURBIDGE: Okay. 
COURT: He's given his opinion. 
MR. BURBIDGE) Are you currently acting 







BURBIDGE: Your Honor, I'm flipping over 








MR. BURBIDGE) This exhibit starts off with 










you please identify the top page? 
July 
The top page of Exhibit 10 entitled Attorneys' 
by the Durbano Law Firm after July 1998 
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1 parenthesis Flynn Foreclosure is a - again a culmination of, on 
2 a month-to-month basis the hours spent in regards to the new 
3 file, as well as the, the fees, the costs expended, and again 
4 the far right column finance charges calculated as previous. 
5 Q So is this simply a summary of the bills that follow? 
6 A That is correct. Up until the end of June 2000. 
7 Q Okay. So the documents following this summary, are 
8 they the actual billing statements produced by your office? 
9 A That is correct. Just as I previously testified. 
10 Q So, these are - these are bills that were submitted 
11 to AIM? 
12 A That is correct. On a monthly basis. 
13 Q And do they accurately represent the amount of time 
14 spent by your office in this case up through June of this year? 
15 A That is correct. Yes, they do. 
16 Q And do they - do these billing records accurately 
17 represent the tasks performed by your office on this case? 
18 A Yes. On a daily basis. The initials of the attorney 
19 and again a brief description of what was done and to the tenth 
20 of the hour the time spent on the matter. 
21 Q I note that in this case it appears the hours -
22 there's a summary of the hours. 
23 A Correct, first column. 
24 Q How many hours were spent on this case (inaudible)? 
25 MR. KNOWLTON: Your Honor, let me interpose now 
70 
1 today. And that's what they told counsel telephonically 
2 and I'm going to ask that their pleadings be stricken and their 
3 default entered. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Response? 
5 MR. BURBIDGE: I agree. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Let's - all right. Strike 
7 the pleadings and enter their default. 
8 Go ahead, Mr. Burbidge. 
9 MR. BURBIDGE: Your Honor, I'd like to address an 
10 issue that was brought up by Mr. Knowlton (inaudible) and that 
11 involves the introduction of billing records by the Durbano Law 
12 Firm. He talked about the discovery requests that she sent. I 
13 have a copy of the discovery requests dated July 7th, 1999, and 
14 he requests "all documents that the plaintiff and his counsel 
15 intend to introduce into evidence at the trial of the matter 
16 not previously furnished to defendant as part of the Court's 
17 order compelling discovery." Now, when I went back and pulled 
18 my responses to that because (inaudible) answering them was -
19 MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, isn't all of this water under 
20 the bridge? (inaudible) motion to reconsider, it seems to me. 
21 THE COURT: Let him, I'm going to allow him to -
22 MR. BURBIDGE: Judge, the point is, our response said 
23 any documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
24 inspection, copying at a mutually-convenient time and place. 
25 Now, in the spirit of cooperation we also forwarded at that 
124 
1 same time when we answered these copies of all the bills that 
2 I we had incurred to that point to Mr. Knowlton. That's why he's 
3 got copies of our billing records up through June. However, we 
4 did say that these bills and these records, the documents that 
5 he was requesting would be available at our office at any time 
6 for inspection and copying. He made no further requests. He -
7 he didn't ask for anything to be supplemented or ask for any 
8 additional bills. He never came or offered to come to our 
9 office to inspect what we have. And Your Honor, that's -
10 that's the reason why Mr. Knowlton did not have the bills up 
11 through the current time. 
12 THE COURT: I'm sorry, counsel. Everybody wants to 
13 change the presumption in the rules. The rules say that there 
14 is an ongoing burden of discovery upon the party to disclose 
15 the discovery. And everybody wants to come in and say, Well, 
16 we told him they could have it if they come, but they didn't 
17 ask for it. Bottom line is if you're the plaintiff in the 
18 case, and you want to present evidence, you have an ongoing 
19 duty to disclose that evidence as it becomes due or as it 
20 becomes known to you. That wasn't done in this particular 
21 situation. You cannot unilaterally say, Well, they're 
22 available for an inspection at our place. You can come do 
23 that. That is - they can do that. And if they don't do it -
24 they do it at their own peril. But it doesn't change the 
25 underlying burden that the plaintiff has an ongoing duty to 
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1 disclose any evidence that you intend to rely on. It's solely 
2 within your realm. You're the ones that have to produce it. 
3 There's no way that they're required under the rules to write 
4 you every month and say have you discovered anything else new 
5 about your case that you're going to hit us with or that you're 
6 going to present to us? You have the ongoing duty to provide 
7 them. Just like they can't come in and blind side you with an 
8 affirmative defense that they haven't raised. They have an 
9 ongoing duty to provide you with information that they have 
10 within their realm. So, I'm not going to revisit that issue. 
11 Mr. Durbano, if you'll come back up, please. 
12 MR. KNOWLTON: Your Honor, I think they wanted to 
13 call a witness out of turn. 
14 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. 
15 MR. BURBIDGE: Your Honor, one of the questions we 
16 had is we've got Mr. Rick Hayden here -
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. BURBIDGE: - from AIM. He came down from 
19 Portland, Oregon, this morning, and he's due to fly out this 
20 evening. 
21 THE COURT: That's fine. If you would like -
22 MR. BURBIDGE: I don't know how much time they 
23 anticipate taking with Mr. Durbano, but if it's going to be 
24 excessive at all, I would request we take (inaudible). 
25 THE COURT: You may take Mr. Hayden out of order. 
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give them and say enough is enough and the free ride is over. 
That's all I have to say and maybe counsel can explain it for 
us. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Go ahead Mr. Burbidge. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Your Honor it seems to me that Mr. 
Knowlton raises, or discusses two issues here; one is the 
motion we made to alter the judgment for the attorney's fees 
incurred between June of 1999 and July of 2000. Regardless of 
what Counsel thinks, we're not trying to wear you down. This 
not running back and forth like he did with his mother. Bottom 
line is we came to Court on the first day of trial and we were 
told that the Court would not hear evidence on that issue. We 
did not have an opportunity to research that issue at that 
time. Upon further research we found the case that we believe 
is directly on point that says that the bottom line is that 
denying us the ability to present this evidence is something 
that was not appropriate given there was no order setting 
deadlines for turning in fees. 
THE COURT: But your evidence wasn't prohibited 
because you did not fail to comply with some particular 
deadline because I agree, there was no deadline and there was 
no final order for you to produce evidence in this situation. 
You were prohibited from doing that under Rule 2 6 which says 
that once you do provide evidence, you must continue to 
22 
1 supplement. That was the basis and it's always been that way. 
2 There was no deadline. This isn't a situation where you come 
3 back under the case that you've told me and say, Gee Judge, 
4 there was no deadline so we didn't know when discovery was over 
5 and therefore we didn't produce. You produced and in your own 
6 document you said we will continue to supplement this up until 
7 the time of trial and then you didn't supplement. So your case 
8 is right on point, but not to what happened here. This isn't a 
9 situation where there was no deadline and then you come in and 
10 I say, Well gosh, because you didn't give it them before some 
11 arbitrary date, therefore you can't go forward. You gave it 
12 to them for the first, I don't know how many months that you've 
13 incurred and then you stopped and you never supplemented and 
14 Rule 26 which I have highlighted which I wanted to read into 
15 the record when we get to it, clearly says there is an 
16 affirmative duty to supplement. This isn't the surprise Rambo 
17 type situation that the case that you quoted me is right on 
18 point about. 
19 I had a similar situation before where there were no 
20 deadlines. The lawyers told me that they were cooperating and 
21 then all of a sudden the week before trial, cooperation broke 
22 and then one side wanted me to punish the other side for not 
23 complying with discovery and there was no discovery order, so I 
24 had nothing with which to enforce it. That's the type of 
25 situation that's raised here, Mr. Burbidge. I did not allow 
23 
1 I you to go into it in your case in chief because you failed to 
2 supplement under Rule 26. So I just want you to make sure 
3 that, I want to address Rule 26, not that there's some deadline] 
4 out here that cut you off somewhere because there wasn't one. 
5 I agree with that. I've never felt that there was a deadline. 
6 You gave him the information for years and then at a point in 
7 time, you guys quit sending him discovery. Well, the rule 
8 doesn't allow you to do that. It's your duty to maintain and 
9 supplement. The rule says, "A party who has made a disclosure 
10 under Sub-division A," which was a response to interrogatories, 
11 "or response to request for discovery with a response is under 
12 a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include 
13 information thereafter acquired if ordered by the Court or in 
14 the following circumstances. A party is under a duty to 
15 supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under Sub-
16 division A if the party learns that in some material respect 
17 information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect or if 
18 additional or corrective information has not been known to the 
19 other parties during the discovery process or in writing with 
20 respect to testimony of an expert, which is not applicable 
21 here. A party is under a duty to seasonably amend the prior 
22 response to an interrogatory, request for production, or 
23 request for admission if the party learns that the response is 
24 in some material respect, incomplete or incorrect." In this 
25 instance, it was incomplete and "if additional or corrective 
24 
1 information has not been otherwise made known to the other 
2 parties during the discovery process, or in writing." So you 
3 don't even have to necessarily send over amended 
4 interrogatories. As Mr. Knowlton said, he would have accepted 
5 a phone call. The rule does not allow that. Rule just simply 
6 said you could have written him a letter and said Mr. Knowlton, 
7 here's the rest of our stuff. We've attached it here. This is 
8 in response to interrogatory 22 that we sent you five or six 
9 months ago and that was the basis of my ruling as to why you 
10 were not allowed to go into it. The rules clearly say that you 
11 must supplement. It's your duty. It's not his. I remember 
12 you made the argument that, Well, he could have called us. He 
13 doesn't have a duty to call. It's your duty to supplement once 
14 he makes the request. You made the argument that his request 
15 was ambiguous. Wasn't ambiguous. You answered it for the 
16 first eighteen months, or fifteen months or whatever. You and 
17 Mr. Durbano had no problems at all sending Mr. Knowlton the 
18 information that you were going to need and then for whatever 
19 reasons, you stopped and that was the basis of my ruling and so 
20 when you guys come and say, Well gee, Judge, there's no 
21 discovery deadline. I agree. This wasn't a discovery deadline 
22 case. This was a situation where you started down the road of 
23 discovery and then you stopped doing it. 
24 Go ahead. 
25 MR. BURBIDGE: Okay. The second issue that Mr. 
25 
TabD 
Douglas M. Durbano (*42W) 
George W. Burbidge II («*6503) 
DURBANO LAW FIRM 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
476 VV. Heritage Park Blvd.. ^200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (SOI) 776-4111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUMY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN INTERSTATE MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, a non resident corporation. 
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vs. 
MICHAEL E. FLYNN; INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, an agency of the United States 
America; BOLT AND NUT SUPPLY; 
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CASUALTY INSURANCE; BRUCE C. 
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EDWARDS; AND JOHN DOES 1 THRU X. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, by and through us attorneys of record, hereby submits the following responses to 
Defendant Edwards' Second Set of Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories as 
follows: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST NO. 1: The quit claim or sheriffs deed to the subject property to James and 
Helen Edwards demonstrated in Judge Heffernan's court during Mr. Durbano's cross examination 
of Bruce Edwards. 
v / RESPONSE NO. 1. Any documents responsive lo this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and place. 
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PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS 
TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
SET OF REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
AND INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 980907330 
Judee W. Brent West 
REQUEST NO. 2: Any documents in the possession of plaintiff or his counsel 
demonstrating conveyances of the subject property since Lhe same was owned by defendant Flynn. 
y RESPONSE NO. 2: Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and place. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Any documents in the possession of plaintiff or his counsel dealing with 
the bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings of defendant Flynn. 
y RESPONSE NO. 3: Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and place. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Any documents in the possession of plaintiff or his counsel relating to 
the sheriffs sale of the property. 
^/ RESPONSE NO. 4: Any documenls responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient lime and place. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Any documents in the possession of the plaintiff or his counsel relating 
to the writ of execution against the property by any creditor or defendant Flynn. 
^ RESPONSE NO. 5: Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient lime and place. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Any letters, memos or correspondence from any person or entity 
claiming or evidencing any legal interest in the subject property since it was acquired by defendant 
Flynn. 
RESPONSE NO. 6: Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and place. 
2 
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REQUEST NO. 7: All time slips, billings, and payment records, along with computer 
records of the same, relating to the preparation, filing, and/or prosecution of the present legal action 
(not to be confused with the companion Judge Heffernan matter). 
/ RESPONSE NO, 7: Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and place. 
REQUEST NO. 8: All documents that the plaintiff and his counsel intend to introduce into 
evidence at the trial of the matter, not previously furnished to defendant as part of the court's order 
compelling discovery. 
RESPONSE NO. 8: Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for 
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and place. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Please state the name and address of all witnesses that the plaintiff 
intends to call as witnesses al the trial of the above matter (expert and lay witnesses) along with a 
brief summary of their expected testimony. 
RESPONSE NO, 9: 
1. Richard Hayden, 1825 Palisades Terrace, Lake Oswego, Oregon 97034. He will 
testify about payments which were missed under the Trust Deed and Note. 
2. Val Petersen, 476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., #200, Layton, Utah 84040. He will give 
expert opinion regarding amounts due under the Note and payments made. 
3. Representative of Second District Court who will verify receipt of funds. 
4. Douglas M Durbano who will testify regarding attorney's fees incurred in this matter 
and their reasonableness. 
5. Possible attorney as expert witness to testify as to reasonableness of attorney's fees. 
j 
REQUEST NO. 10: Please state all amounts presently unpaid under the terms and 
conditions of the subject trust deed and note, including: 
a. What specific months are presently unpaid. 
b. What specific monthly payment amounts are unpaid. 
c. What late charges, if any, are claimed presently due. 
d. For what months and years are late charges due and in what monthly amounts. 
e. Please list and itemize all payments claimed past due under the trust deed and note not 
specifically detailed above. 
f. Please list'and itemize all sums and amounts that would be required at this time to fully 
cure or bring current the trust deed and note. 
RESPONSE NO. 10: 
a. December, 1997, January, February, March, April, May, June, July, August, September, 
October, November and December 1998, January, February, March, April, May, June, July and 
August 1999. 
b. 5700.65 for each month, with possible adjustments due to interest fluctuations. 
c. S236.20 for each month from December 1997 through July, 1999, inclusive. 
d. Late charges are due for the months of December 1997 through July 1999 inclusive in the 
amount of 5236.20 per month. 
f. Principal - 560,538.88; monthly payments of S700.65 plus or minus from December, 1997 
through August, 1999 = 514,713.65; late fees of S236.20 per month from December, 1997 through 
July, 1999 - S4,724.00; costs and attorneys fees to protect lender's interest $29,955.00; total 
$109,932.33. 
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REQUEST NO. 11; Please describe any and all amounts or funds that have been tendered 
to the plaintiff by the defendants or other persons toward payment of the trust deed or note. 
RESPONSE NO. 11: Funds have been tendered to Plaintiff since December 1, 1997 as 
follows: on May 15, 1998, Sl,210.56 was received from the Court and accepted by Plaintiff. In 
October, 1998, a cashier's check for 57,006.50 was tendered, but not accepted by Plaintiff because 
this amounts was inadequate to cure the default. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Please describe the status of the cashier's check furnished to plaintiffs 
counsel at the outset of the action, and also please provide: 
a. Who presently has possession of the cashier's check. 
b. Where is the cashier's check presently located. 
c. If cashed, state the date the check was cashed. 
RESPONSE NO. 12: The cashier's check #174574, dated October 23, 1998, was sent hy 
certified mail to David Knowllon, attorney for James Edwards. 
REQUEST NO. 13: State whether Richard Hay den was present in Judge Heffernan's court 
when his counsel, Mr. Durbano described a deed on the subject property listing James and/or Helen 
Edwards as grantee(s). 
RESPONSE NO. 13: Richard Hayden does not know if he was present in Judge Heffernan's 
court when the events described in this request took place. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Please describe how plaintiff or his counsel came into possession oftliis 
deed. Also, give the date when plaintiff or his counsel first became aware of this deed. 
RESPONSE NO. 14: Plaintiff believes that its attorney was advised by Edward's attorney 
of a Sheriffs sale during the time of the previous trial and got copies from the Sheriffs office. 
5 
REQUEST NO. 15: Please state when and how the plaintiff first was first informed that 
defendant Bruce C. Edwards claimed any type of interest in the subject property. 
RESPONSE NO. 15: Plaintiff believes that in 1994, Defendant Brace Edwards spoke with 
Arthur Berg> Plaintiffs servicing agent at that time and offered to pay the arrearage on the note. 
i/ REQUEST NO. 16: Please describe the nature of any and all interests and/or claims to the 
subject property ever made by defendant Edwards. 
RESPONSE NO. 16: Defendant Edwards has better knowledge of claims he has made 
to the subject property then does Plaintiff. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Please list all persons or entities that have ever made any claim to the 
subject property to the plaintiff. 
RESPONSE NO. 17: Plaintiff obtained a title report on the property at the beginning of this 
action. Of those parties listed, Defendant Flynn expressed a belief that he may have an ownership 
interest in the property. Ohio Casualty Insurance is still trying to determine their interests. 
Defendant Utah Tax Commission executed a stipulation acknowledging its interests inferior to 
Plaintiffs. James, Helen and Bruce Edwards have also claimed equitable interest in the property. 
REQUEST NO. 18: Please list all persons or entities that in plaintiff s judgment have any 
legal or equitable interest in the subject property. 
RESPONSE NO. 18: Plaintiff, and possibly some of the parties listed in Response No. 17 
above. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Please state whether the two (2) monthly trust deed payments ordered 
by Judge Heffeman was ever made to plaintiff and if so, state the date(s) and amount(s) of such 
payments and by whom they were made. 
6 
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RESPONSE NO. 19: Plaintiff is unaware of who made the payment to the court or the exact 
date; however, the amount of SI,210.56 was received from the court on May 15, 1998. 
REQUEST NO- 20: State whether James or Helen Edwards ever made any payments to 
plaintiff on the subject property, and if so, please state: 
a. The amounts paid and the dates of payments. 
b. Describe what there was about the payment that identified it being made by James or 
Helen Edwards. 
e. Please attach copies of any checks, drafts, or other payments made by James or Edwards. 
f. State whetHer plaintiff or his counsel ever wrote to defendant Edwards or others regarding 
the interest, if any, of James or Helen Edwards, and if so, please attach copies of any such 
correspondence. 
RESPONSE NO. 20: 
a. It appears that James Edwards proffered a cashiers check for 57,006.50 on October 23, 
1998. 
b. The remitter section of the check referred to James Edward. 
e. The original of this check has been relumed lo Defendant's counsel via certified mail. 
. / ' ' f. Any correspondence by Plaintiff or its counsel not protected by attorney/client privilege 
was sent to Defendants James and Helen Edwards and would be in their possession and would 
therefore be more easily obtained by Defendants than by Plaintiff. 
<y REQUEST NO- 21: Please attach to your answers hereby copies of any and all 
correspondence between plaintiff and his counsel and James and/or Helen Edwards. 
7 
nn * 
RESPONSE NO. 21: If any such correspondence exists, it is already in the possession of 
Defendants. At the current time Plaintiff has no recollection of ever corresponding with James and 
Helen Edwards. 
DATED this l £ day of August, 1999. 
DURBANO LAW FIRM 
tomeys 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MARK MATTICE, : Case No. 991001-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for two 
counts of Attempted Forgery, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 (Attempt) & 76-6-501 (Forgery), in 
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred 
on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
See Addendum A (Judgment, Sentence and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in refusing to quash the 
bindover on the forgery charges and the theft by deception charge 
without sufficient evidence of knowledge or intent? 
Standard of Review: The decision of whether to bind a 
defendant over for trial presents a question of law reviewed de 
novo without deference. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 1 8; 414 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Mark Mattice's ("Mattice") motion to quash the 
bindover is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 157. 
His preliminary hearing is preserved at R.156. 
STATUTE 
The following statute is determinative of the issue on 
appeal: 
Forgery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999): 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority 
or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the 
writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of another, whether 
the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to 
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any 
other method of recording valuable information 
including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, 
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of 
value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument 
or writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or 
claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Mattice was charged by information with four counts of 
forgery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. R.9-11. An arrest warrant 
was issued. R.6-7. After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate 
bound Mattice over on all four counts. R.40-41,156. Mattice 
moved to quash the bindover on all four counts. R.108-13,157. 
Ruling from the bench, the trial court denied the motion as to 
Count IV and reserved its ruling as to the other three counts. 
R.114,157 [13] . The court denied the motion as to the remaining 
three counts in a subsequent memorandum decision, relying on 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985). R.108-113,114. 
Mattice entered a conditional plea of no contest to two 
counts of attempted forgery, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 (attempt) 
& 76-6-501 (forgery), pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (i) (2000) 
and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). R.126-27 
(minute entry); 129-37 (conditional guilty plea of no contest to 
two counts of attempted forgery). Mattice timely appeals from 
his two convictions for attempted forgery. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 2, 1998, Mark Mattice went to Check City to 
cash a check. R.156[10]. The check was made out to Mattice, 
bore the signature of "Daniel Dressen," was numbered 7211, and 
was drawn on the account of Daniel and Pat Dressen in the amount 
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of $2500. Mattice endorsed the back of the check in the presence 
of Check City employee Jennifer Horning ("Horning"). Mattice 
told Horning that he received the check for financial consulting. 
R.156[15] . 
Horning called the Dressen residence to verify funds and 
spoke to Pat Dressen. Id. Pat Dressen told Horning that the 
check was stolen when her purse was stolen. Id. She also told 
Horning that she did not know Mattice, that she did not issue a 
check to him, and that she did not write out the check. Id. 
Horning put Pat Dressen on hold, and went back to the front 
of the store to ask Mattice where he got the check. Id. Mattice 
stated that someone loaned him the money to buy a car. 
R.156 [16]. In order to stall Mattice, Horning asked him to fill 
out a form. Id. Meanwhile, she went back to the phone and asked 
Pat Dressen if she would be willing to press charges. Id. Pat 
Dressen indicated that she would. Id. 
Horning called the police. Id. While she waited for them 
to arrive, she made small talk with Mattice. Id. Horning said 
Mattice was friendly. Id. Five to ten minutes later, an officer 
arrived while Mattice was still on the premises. Id. 
Horning testified that Mattice was a regular customer at 
Check City. R.156[20]. He normally cashed payroll checks. 
R.156 [21]. Mattice had a "good customer status" with Check City 
because none of his past checks were dishonored. Id. 
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Accordingly, Horning did not always call to verify funds when 
Mattice presented a check for cashing. R.156[22]. 
Mattice had presented three other checks for cashing in 
June, 1998. R.156[17-18]. All three checks were made out to 
Mattice and were drawn on the account of Robert F. and Betty J. 
Johnson. Id. Horning personally accepted two of the checks, 
numbers 268 (made out for $269) and 269 (made out for $398) . 
R.156[18-19] . Mattice endorsed each of the checks in Horningfs 
presence. Id. The third check, number 267 (made out for $225), 
was also cashed by Mattice at Check City and endorsed by him. 
R.156 [17]. Horning did not know under what circumstances Mattice 
came into possession of the checks. R.156[24]. 
Two of the checks, 267 and 268, were returned by the bank 
for insufficient funds. R.156[22]. A stop-payment was placed on 
269. R.156[22-23]. Horning called on all three checks and 
learned that they were not issued to Mattice. R.156[12]. The 
State did not present any evidence establishing that these checks 
were stolen. Horning was aware of these dishonored checks at the 
time that Mattice presented check number 7211. R.156[14]. She 
agreed to cash check 7211 for Mattice in the hopes of covering 
the amount of money involved in the three other dishonored 
checks. R.156[15]. 
William Daniel Dressen ("Dressen") testified that the 
signature on check 7211 was not his. R.156[3-4]. He stated that 
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he did not authorize the check to be made out to Mattice, nor did 
he know Mattice. R.156[4]. Dressen also stated that he did not 
lend the money to Mattice. R.156[5]. 
Dressen further testified that an entire book of checks was 
stolen when his wifefs purse was taken from their car. R.156[6]. 
Check 7211 was included in the book of stolen checks. Id. 
Dressen explained that several checks were presented to the bank 
for "less cash." Id. Some were written out to other businesses. 
Id. In short, many of the stolen checks were forged. Id. 
Dressen had copies of all the forged checks, but they were not 
presented at Mattice1s preliminary hearing. Id. 
The Dressens called the police regarding the stolen, forged 
checks. R.156[7]. Although there were ongoing investigations 
regarding the checks, court proceedings were under way only as to 
7211. R.156[8]. 
Detective Jennifer Smartt ("Smartt") of the South Salt Lake 
City Police Department investigated check 7211. R.156[29]. 
Smartt testified that Mattice had claimed that the account holder 
had a lending business. Id. Smartt called the Dressens, who 
denied having a lending business. Id. They also stated that the 
did not authorize Mattice to cash the check. Id. Smartt!s 
investigation was limited to check 7211. R.156[30]. She did not 
interview anyone else but the Dressens, nor did she have any 
involvement with the other three checks cashed by Mattice at 
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Check City that were dishonored. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Matticefs motion to quash 
the bindover on the forgery charges where the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence that Mattice acted with culpable 
knowledge or intent in cashing checks that were later discovered 
to be stolen and/or forged. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MATTICETS 
MOTION TO QUASH THE BINDOVER ON FOUR COUNTS OF FORGERY 
WHERE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CULPABLE 
INTENT OR KNOWLEDGE. 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must establish 
probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, I 10; 414 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (citing State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 
(Utah 1995); Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2) (1999)). "In making a 
determination as to probable cause, the magistrate should view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and 
resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution." Pledger, 
896 P.2d at 1229. "Yet, f[t]he magistrate's role in this 
process, while limited, is not that of a rubber stamp for the 
prosecution. . . . Even with this limited role, the magistrate 
must attempt to ensure that all 'groundless and improvident 
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prosecutions1 are ferreted out no later than the preliminary 
hearing.f" Clark, 2001 UT at f 10 (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 
UT App 159, 1 7, 3 P.3d 725 (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 
778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Clark defined the quantum of 
evidence necessary to satisfy the probable cause standard. See 
2001 UT App at M 11-16 (citations omitted). "[T]he prosecution 
must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief 
that an offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it." Id. at SI 16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Comparing this standard to that applied to motions for a directed 
verdict, the Court also stated that "the prosecution must still 
produce !!believable evidence of all the elements of the crime 
charged.11" Id. at 1 15 (quotations omitted). "This 'reasonable 
belief1 standard has the advantage of being more easily 
understood while still allowing magistrates to fulfill the 
primary purpose of the preliminary hearing, 'ferreting out . . . 
groundless and improvident prosecutions.1" Id. at 1 16 (quoting 
Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84). 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in refusing 
to quash the bindover. See id. Even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence does not support a 
"reasonable belief" that Mattice knowingly or intentionally 
cashed a stolen and fraudulent check in violation of Utah!s 
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forgery statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). That statute 
provides: 
Forgery —"Writing" defined: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his 
authority or utters any such altered writing. . . . 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any 
other method of recording valuable information 
including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, 
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of 
value, right, privilege, or identification; . . . 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any 
other instrument or writing representing an interest in 
or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in 
or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
The magistrate erroneously bound Mattice over on four counts 
of forgery, R.114, based on the following insufficient evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing: 
Counts I, II, & III 
Mattice presented three checks, numbers 267, 268, and 269, 
for cashing at Check City in June, 1998. R.156[17-18]. Each 
check was made out to Mattice and drawn on the account of Robert 
F. and Betty J. Johnson. Id. Horning, a Check City employee, 
cashed checks 268 (made out for $269) and 269 (made out for 
$398). R.156[18-19]. Mattice endorsed checks 268 and 269 in 
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Horningfs presence. Id. Mattice also endorsed and cashed the 
third check, 267 (made out for $225), at Check City. R.156[17]. 
Horning did not know under what circumstances Mattice came into 
possession of the checks. R.156[24]. 
Checks 267 and 268 were returned to Check City by the bank 
for insufficient funds. R.156[22]. A stop-payment was placed on 
269. R.156[22-23]. Horning called on all three checks and 
learned that they were not issued to Mattice. R.156[12]. The 
State did not present any evidence at the preliminary hearing 
establishing that these three checks were stolen. See generally 
R.156. 
Count IV 
On September 2, 1998, Mark Mattice went to Check City to 
cash a check. R.156[10]. The check was made out to Mattice, 
bore the signature of "Daniel Dressen," was numbered 7211, and 
was drawn on the account of Daniel and Pat Dressen in the amount 
of $2500. Mattice endorsed the back of the check in the presence 
of Check City employee Horning. R.156[18-19]. Mattice told 
Horning that he received the check for financial consulting. 
R.156[15]. Horning was aware of dishonored check numbers 267, 
268, and 269, at the time that he presented check 7211. 
R.156[14]. She agreed to cash check 7211 in the hope of covering 
the three other dishonored checks. R.156[15]. 
Horning called the Dressen residence to verify funds and 
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spoke to Pat Dressen. Id. Pat Dressen told Horning that the 
check was stolen when her purse was stolen. Id. She also told 
Horning that she did not know Mattice, that she did not issue a 
check to him, and that she did not write out the check. Id. 
Horning put Pat Dressen on hold, and went back to the front 
of the store to ask Mattice where he got the check. Id. This 
time Mattice stated that someone loaned him the money to buy a 
car. R.156[16]. In order to stall Mattice, Horning asked him to 
fill out a form. Id. Meanwhile, she went back to the phone and 
asked Pat Dressen if she would be willing to press charges. Id. 
Pat Dressen indicated that she would. Id. 
Horning called the police. Id. While she waited for them 
to arrive, she made small talk with Mattice. Id. Five to ten 
minutes later, an officer arrived while Mattice was still on the 
premises. Id. 
William Daniel Dressen testified at the preliminary hearing 
that the signature on check 7211 was not his. R.156[3-4]. He 
stated that he did not authorize the check to be made out to 
Mattice, nor did he know Mattice. R.156[4]. Dressen also stated 
that he did not lend the money to Mattice. R.156[5]. 
Dressen further testified that an entire book of checks was 
stolen when his wife's purse was taken from their car. R.156[6]. 
Check 7211 was included in the book of stolen checks. Id. 
Dressen explained that several checks were presented to the bank 
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for "less cash." Id. Some were written out to other businesses. 
Id. In short, many of the stolen checks were forged. Id. 
Dressen had copies of all the forged checks, but they were not 
presented at Mattice!s preliminary hearing. Id. 
The Dressens called the police regarding the stolen, forged 
checks. R.156[7]. Although there were ongoing investigations 
regarding the checks, court proceedings were under way only as to 
7211. R.156[8]. 
Detective Jennifer Smartt ("Smartt") of the South Salt Lake 
City Police Department investigated check 7211. R.156[29]. 
Smartt testified that Mattice had claimed that the account holder 
had a lending business. Id. Smartt called the Dressens, who 
denied having a lending business. Id. They also stated that the 
did not authorize Mattice to cash the check. Id. Smarttfs 
investigation was limited to check 7211. R.156[30]. She did not 
interview anyone else but the Dressens, nor did she have any 
involvement with the other three checks cashed by Mattice at 
Check City that were dishonored. Id. 
The foregoing evidence, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, does not establish probable cause 
because it does not support a "reasonable belief" that Mattice 
acted with culpable knowledge or intent when he cashed the 
checks. Clark, 2001 UT at 1 16; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
501(1). "Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be 
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inferred from the personfs conduct viewed in light of all the 
accompanying circumstances." State v, Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289 
SI 10, 988 P.2d 949 (citations omitted). 
Because of the difficulty of proving knowledge and 
intent in a prosecution for forgery, the quantum of 
evidence the State must produce before an inference of 
knowledge will arise should not be unrealistically 
burdensome. But there should be some facts or 
circumstances from which an inference can logically be 
drawn before the defendant can be required to mount a 
defense and prove his lack of knowledge or intent. 
Id.; see also State v. Castonquav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 
1983) ("fThe law can presume the intention so far as realized in 
the act, but not an intention beyond what was so realized.!") 
(quotation omitted). 
As to counts I, II and III, the State entirely failed to 
present evidence that the checks were stolen. See generally 
R.156 (Preliminary Hearing). The only evidence that the State 
presented was that two of the checks were dishonored by the bank 
for insufficient funds, and the other check had a stop-payment on 
it. R.156[22-23]. Moreover, Check City employee Horning did not 
assert that the checks were stolen. R.156[10-27]. In fact, she 
did not know the circumstances surrounding the checks. 
R.156[24]. She only knew, after calling about the checks once 
they were returned, that they were not issued to Mattice. 
R.156 [12]. Consequently, the evidence establishes only that the 
checks were dishonored. See generally R.156 (Preliminary 
Hearing). 
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The fact that Mattice cashed checks that were later returned 
does not support a "reasonable belief/' Clark, 2001 UT at 1 16, 
that he acted with a "purpose to defraud, or with knowledge that 
he [was] facilitating a fraud." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1). 
Many people cash checks in the course of innocent transactions 
that are later dishonored. Moreover, checks are dishonored for a 
myriad of reasons, including a closed account or the account 
holder's failure to deposit funds to cover the checks. To 
presume guilt from such an everyday occurrence would stretch the 
bounds of a proper inference of guilt and impermissibly 
criminalize innocent conduct. Compare State v. Williams, 712 
P.2d 220, 221 (Utah 1985) (affirming forgery conviction where 
evidence showed that check cashed, and later dishonored by bank, 
was reported stolen by account holder); see also Castonquay, 663 
P.2d at 1326 ("'The law can presume the intention so far as 
realized in the act, but not an intention beyond what was so 
realized.!") (quotation omitted). 
As to all the counts, nothing in the evidence suggests that 
Mattice behaved suspiciously when he cashed the checks. Contrary 
to one who is in the habit of cashing fraudulent checks, Mattice 
had a history of legally cashing checks at Check City and had a 
"good customer status" there. R.156[21]. When he cashed the 
checks at issue here, he did not select a location where he was 
unknown in order to downplay his activity and preserve his 
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anonymity as a forger might do. R.156[21-22]. He willingly 
endorsed the back of the checks, which were made out to him, in 
front of Horning. R.156[17-18] . 
Moreover, Mattice explained his possession of check 7211 to 
Horning. He told her that he received the money for financial 
consulting and that the money was a loan to buy a car, 
establishing that he received the loan in exchange for financial 
advice. R.156[15-16]. He similarly told Detective Smartt that 
the account holder had a lending business. R.156[29]. Although 
the true account holder denied these statements, nothing in the 
evidence suggests that Mattice did not accept these claims as 
true, in good faith, from the person that actually stole the 
checks from the Dressens. R.156[6]. 
In addition, Mattice was not evasive when there was a delay 
in cashing check number 7211. He remained at Check City and 
talked to Horning throughout the period of delay rather than 
abandoning the check and leaving. R.156[16]. This period of 
delay lasted for as long as it took Horning to call Dressen to 
verify funds, to go back to the phone to ask Dressen if she 
wanted to press charges and then to call the police, plus the 
five or ten minutes it took for the police to arrive. Id. If 
Mattice had a guilty conscience, he would have left Check City at 
some point within this long delay suspecting that Horning was on 
to him. Compare Clark, 2001 UT at 1 20 (sufficient evidence of 
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intent for forgery where defendant abandoned check after delay in 
cashing it; if defendant was true holder in due course, he would 
have "taken the check . . . to !take that up with the account 
holder!"). 
As a final matter concerning check number 7211, the evidence 
does not support an inference of intent or knowledge because 
check 7211 was just one of a number of checks that were stolen 
from the Dressens, but that were never linked to Mattice. 
R.156[6], Check 7211 was one of a pack of twenty-five that were 
stolen from the Dressen's car. Id. No one was prosecuted for 
the theft, and Mattice was not linked with the theft in any way. 
R.156 [7-8]. A number of the checks were presented to the bank 
for "less cash" and others were written out to businesses. 
R.156[6]. No one was prosecuted with regard to these other 
checks. R.156[7], Given that someone else stole the checks and 
fraudulently passed them for cash or to other businesses, and 
likely Mattice, Matticefs culpable knowledge or intent cannot be 
inferred under the circumstances. 
In sum, the State did not present sufficient evidence to 
support a "reasonable belief," Clark, 2001 UT at 1 16, that 
Mattice acted "with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge 
that he [was] facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1). Accordingly, the trial court erred 
in denying Mattice!s motion to quash the bindover. See Clark, 
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2001 UT at 1 16. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Mattice respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
quash the bindover on two counts of attempted forgery. 
SUBMITTED this 13**- day of April, 2001. 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK R MATTICE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 981917762 FS 
Judge: TIMOTHY R HANSON 
Date: October 22, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: KENNETH UPDEGROVE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RONALD S FUJINO 




Date of birth: April 14, 1959 
Video 
Tape Number: 10/22/99 Tape Count: 10:23 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED FORGERY - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 08/20/1999 No Contest 
2. ATTEMPTED FORGERY - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 08/20/1999 No Contest 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED FORGERY a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) The 
total time suspended for this charge is 1 year(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED FORGERY a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) The 
total time suspended for this charge is 1 year(s). 
Case No: 981917762 
Date: Oct 22, 1999 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Count 1 & 2 are to run consecutively, and not concurrently 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Due: $0.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: $2500,00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $5000.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The* defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Case No: 981917762 
Date: Oct 22, 1999 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Perform community service hours. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
pay restitution to Chedk City, in amount of $887.87, at a minimum 
rate of $100 per month. 
Comply with substance abuse evaluation, at^Cornerstone counseling, 
and/or as directed by APP, and enter and successfully complete any 
program as may be directed by app. 
Maintain fulltime employment, and residency. 
Complete 50 hours community service, unjaer the direction of APP. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of ((Lfi JH 
[MOTHY R HkNSON 
'District Court, Judge
 0 J 
